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2139 
REMAINING SILENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY: 
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND GRANTS OF IMMUNITY 
FOR TRIBAL COURT DEFENDANTS 
Philipp C. Kunze* 
Abstract: A defendant in state and federal courts is entitled to a constitutional protection 
against self-incrimination. The Fifth Amendment establishes this privilege, which can only be 
overcome through a voluntary waiver or by the granting of an appropriate level of immunity. 
Those grants of immunity were made mutually binding on the state and federal governments 
in Kastigar v. United States and Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor. 
However, in Talton v. Mayes, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments do not limit the conduct of the more than 560 federally recognized Indian tribes 
within the boundaries of the United States. In response, Congress exercised its plenary power 
and passed the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). Under federal law, ICRA extended many, but 
not all, protections afforded under the Bill of Rights to tribal defendants without any required 
action from the tribes; many of the provisions are verbatim from the Constitution’s 
amendments. However, the complicated distribution of jurisdiction amongst sovereigns, as 
well as the tribal authority to create and implement unique constitutions and systems of justice, 
calls into question the standard by which to evaluate violations of the privilege against self-
incrimination in tribal court. Furthermore, rare examples exist in which a court of any 
jurisdiction has considered or extended the mutually binding nature of grants of immunity and 
the use of testimony compelled by a separate jurisdiction to include tribal courts. This 
Comment suggests that violations of ICRA’s protections against self-incrimination be 
evaluated under a Fifth Amendment standard, utilizing U.S. Supreme Court precedent. This 
approach ensures a predictable analysis that is consistent with the legislative intent of ICRA 
and minimizes potential complications upon federal habeas review. This Comment further 
suggests that the universal application of Fifth Amendment precedent is a prerequisite for 
mutual and binding recognition of tribal, state, and federal grants of immunity. Mutual 
recognition places tribal courts on equal footing with state and federal courts. Further, a 
defendant facing prosecution in two or more courts exercising concurrent jurisdiction benefits 
when courts extend and recognize binding grants of immunity. Lastly, when grants of 
immunity apply in each jurisdiction, tribal courts and communities are empowered to pursue 
avenues of justice unique to tribal traditions and cultures. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1883, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the seminal case of Ex parte 
Crow Dog.1 The Court held the Dakota Territory federal court did not 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2019. The author is an officer in 
the U.S. Coast Guard, as well as an admitted spokesperson before the Tulalip Tribal Bar. The 
opinions, conclusions, and views expressed herein are solely those of the author; they are not to be 
construed as official and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Coast 
Guard, or the Tulalip Tribes and their agencies. The author gratefully thanks the staff of Washington 
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have jurisdiction to hear the case of an Indian defendant accused of the 
homicide of another Indian on the Great Sioux Reservation.2 Ex parte 
Crow Dog triggered more than 140 years of extensive judicial history,3 as 
the Court analyzed often contradictory, vacillating, and heavy-handed 
congressional action imposing laws on the Indian tribes.4 
Greater awareness of the disparities of rights available to Indians was 
achieved contemporaneously to the broader civil rights movement 
sweeping the nation in the 1960s.5 Congress responded to perceived 
shortcomings in the protections of Indian defendants in tribal courts and 
passed the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).6 While ICRA afforded 
Indians in tribal court many of the privileges and protections of the 
Constitution’s Bill of Rights7 that are essential to the criminal process, 
Congress also made some notable exceptions.8 For example, ICRA does 
not include an establishment clause, a right to bear arms, or legal 
representation for indigent defendants.9 
Despite many of the differences between ICRA and the Bill of Rights, 
both documents utilize substantially similar, and sometimes verbatim, 
language to describe the enumerated rights. By their terms, ICRA and the 
Constitution impose nearly “identical limitation[s]”10 on the federal and 
tribal governments, including a privilege against self-incrimination.11 
However, courts have applied various standards of analysis and 
                                                     
Law Review for their patience and tireless editing to make this Comment possible. Thank you also to 
Professor Robert Anderson for his insight and guidance, and to Professors Molly Cohan and Brenda 
Williams of the Tulalip Tribal Defense Clinic. 
1. 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
2. Id. at 572. 
3. See generally United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 
435 U.S. 191 (1978); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 
376 (1896). 
4. See generally Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012); Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 
U.S.C. §§ 1301–1304 (2012 & Supp. III 2015); Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 
2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, tit. IX, 127 Stat. 54, 118–26 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 25, and 42 
U.S.C.); Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. II, 124 Stat. 2258, 2261–301 
(codified in scattered sections of 25 and 42 U.S.C.). 
5. VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 127–28 
(1983). 
6. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2012)).  
7. U.S. CONST. amends. I–X. 
8. Compare U.S. CONST. amends. VI–VII, with 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (discussing the right to a jury 
trial and representation by counsel). 
9. 25 U.S.C. § 1302. 
10. United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005). 
11. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V, with 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4). 
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interpretation to assess compliance with ICRA’s provisions—some have 
emphasized tribal sovereignty, while others have looked to the textual 
similarities and congressional intent.12 The tribal defendant’s exposure to 
prosecution in tribal, federal, and state courts further complicates the 
inconsistent standard of analysis. 
In United States v. Lara,13 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a 
congressional statute which recognized the tribes’ inherent sovereign 
power to prosecute non-member Indians and removed political 
restrictions on such prosecutions.14 A tribal defendant is thus subject to 
prosecution in any tribal court within the United States and, therefore, the 
defendant is subject to each tribal court’s unique constitution and 
interpretation of ICRA. The Court also held that prosecuting a tribal 
defendant under both tribal and federal law did not violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.15 
According to both the Constitution and ICRA, the government may not 
compel a person “in any criminal case to be a witness against 
themselves.”16 Although federal and state defendants are entitled to the 
privilege against self-incrimination articulated by the Fifth Amendment, 
defendants may still be compelled to testify through the granting of use 
and derivative use immunity or transactional immunity.17 Because a grant 
of immunity minimizes or eliminates the threat of prosecution based on 
the compelled testimony, the defendant receives “very substantial 
protection, commensurate with [the protection] resulting from invoking” 
the Fifth Amendment and must therefore testify.18 However, once a 
federal or state entity makes such a grant of immunity, it is mutually 
binding on other jurisdictions to the extent that the compelled testimony 
or its derivative evidence is the basis for a subsequent prosecution of the 
defendant.19 Only a few courts have considered whether federal and state 
                                                     
12. Compare United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004) (tribal sovereignty), with Becerra-
Garcia, 397 F.3d at 1171 (textual similarities). 
13. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).  
14. Lara, 541 U.S. at 210. The statute in question was called the “Duro fix,” Pub. L. No. 102-137, 
105 Stat. 646 (1991), and was passed in the wake of Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). As the Lara 
Court explained, Duro had held “that a tribe no longer possessed inherent or sovereign authority to 
prosecute a ‘nonmember Indian.’” Lara, 541 U.S. at 197 (citing Duro, 495 U.S. at 682). 
15. Id. 
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself . . . .”); 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (“No Indian tribe . . . shall . . . compel any person 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”). 
17. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001–6005 (2012). 
18. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972). 
19. Id.; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 80 (1964). 
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grants of immunity are binding on tribal courts,20 and none have 
considered the binding effect of tribal grants of immunity. 
This Comment analyzes the interaction between the Fifth Amendment 
and ICRA and the impact of applying federal and tribal standards of 
analysis to tribal defendants. Part I traces the protections provided by the 
Fifth Amendment and the development of mutually binding grants of 
immunity in federal and state courts. Part II provides a general overview 
of the complicated jurisdictional scheme and relationship between the 
tribes, the several states, and the federal government. Part III follows the 
passage of ICRA and the various standards of analysis applied to its 
provisions. Part IV argues that courts of all jurisdictions should analyze 
violations of ICRA’s self-incrimination provision under a federal Fifth 
Amendment standard. This Part also argues that the threat of prosecution 
in a tribal court is sufficient to invoke Fifth Amendment protections in 
federal or state court. Lastly, Part V argues that, having adopted a uniform 
standard of analysis for self-incrimination violations, grants of immunity 
by tribal, state, or federal courts should be mutually binding. 
I. FIFTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Federal and state courts must comply with the constitutional mandates 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights. A defendant or witness is generally 
entitled to invoke a privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth 
Amendment, and compelling testimony without the appropriate 
constitutional safeguards is typically prohibited. One permissible avenue 
of compelling testimony without violating the Fifth Amendment is 
through grants of immunity which prohibit the direct use or derivative use 
of such testimony against the defendant or witness in future prosecutions. 
A. The Fifth Amendment Protects Against a Defendant’s or Witness’s 
Compelled Self-Incrimination 
“I plead the Fifth!” is a common refrain found on the news, on 
television shows, and in movies.21 Although the Bill of Rights protects 
                                                     
20. In re Long Visitor, 523 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1975); Navajo Nation v. MacDonald Jr., 19 Indian 
L. Rep. 6079 (Navajo Nation Sup. Ct. 1992); Tracy v. Superior Court of Maricopa Cty., 810 P.2d 
1030 (Ariz. 1991).  
21. See, e.g., CNBC, Martin Shkreli Testifies Before Congress: Full Testimony, YOUTUBE (Feb. 4, 
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LPIQ_gyiHag (last visited Oct. 1, 2018); Comedy 
Central, Chappelle’s Show - Tron Carter’s “Law & Order” – Uncensored, YOUTUBE (Mar. 1, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HeOVbeh2yr0 (last visited Oct. 1, 2018); MISS SLOANE 
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one’s right to silence, the right is not absolute; the defendant or witness 
must first be entitled to invoke those protections.22 
The Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part that “no 
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.”23 As a protection against “testimonial compulsion,”24 this right 
is “accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to 
secure.”25 Further, despite the clear limiting language, the protections 
offered by the Fifth Amendment may be more broadly “asserted in any 
proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or 
adjudicatory.”26 However, the Fifth Amendment’s protections must still 
be “confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to 
apprehend danger from a direct answer.”27 
When a witness or defendant invokes the protections of the Fifth 
Amendment, the judge must determine if the “silence is justified.”28 A 
court will consider the questions posed to the individual, the questions’ 
implications, and the setting in which the questions were asked; then the 
court determines whether a responsive answer or explanatory demurral 
would threaten the invoked privilege.29 Ultimately, the court must 
determine if the witness has a reasonable cause to apprehend danger of 
prosecution from a direct answer.30 The court will decline the witness’s 
invocation of the privilege only if it is clear under all the circumstances 
that the witness is mistaken and that the contested testimony cannot 
incriminate the witness.31 
                                                     
(FilmNation Entm’t 2016); Theodore Schleifer & Laura Koran, Judicial Watch: Clinton IT Staffer 
Pleads 5th 125 Consecutive Times, CNN (June 22, 2016, 8:56 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2016/06/22/politics/bryan-pagliano-judicial-watch-deposition/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/3YG7-Q9TY]. 
22. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). 
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
24. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486. 
25. Id. 
26. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972) (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 
378 U.S. 52, 93–94 (1964) (White, J., concurring)). 
27. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 486–87. 
30. Id. at 486. 
31. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 580 (1891) (citing Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 
892 (1881)). 
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Invoking the Fifth Amendment also requires satisfying three 
concurrent criteria.32 First, the demanded evidence must be testimonial.33 
Second, the evidence must be compelled.34 Third, the evidence must be 
incriminating.35 
1. Fifth Amendment Evidence Must Be Testimonial 
The Fifth Amendment normally protects defendants and witnesses 
from incriminating themselves only through oral testimony.36 The 
production of physical documents potentially implicates the Fifth 
Amendment in certain instances, even though physical evidence is 
generally not protected.37 In Fisher v. United States,38 the U.S. Supreme 
Court suggested that the act of production may be transformed into a 
testimonial act when a defendant is required to determine which 
documents to produce in response to a subpoena.39 However, the Court 
identified another exception to the exception of transformed testimonial 
production.40 If the records or documents whose existence, authenticity, 
and possession or control by the defendant are a “foregone conclusion,”41 
those documents are not entitled to testimonial status.42 Because the 
documents do not have testimonial status, the defendant cannot invoke 
Fifth Amendment protections in that instance. 
2. Fifth Amendment Evidence Must Be Compelled 
Government agents may compel testimony at a court proceeding or 
through questioning. The Miranda doctrine43 and associated extensive 
                                                     
32. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155 (1958) (“A witness who is compelled to 
testify . . . has no occasion to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination until testimony sought to 
be elicited will in fact tend to incriminate.”). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976). 
37. Id. at 409. 
38. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
39. Id. at 411. 
40. Id. at 391. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 411. The government must demonstrate, however, that the existence, possession, and 
authenticity of the documents are all foregone conclusions. Id. at 411–13. 
43. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (applying the right to silence to custodial 
interrogations and balancing the rights of Americans versus the efficiency and efficacy of police 
investigations to prevent crime). A person in custody “must be warned prior to any questioning that 
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judicial history explore the nuances of statements made during custodial 
interrogation and the application of the Fifth Amendment to those 
circumstances. Testimony outside of custodial interrogations is compelled 
if the witness faces the “cruel trilemma.”44 This trilemma occurs when a 
witness believes there are only three choices in response to a question at 
the time of questioning: (1) lie and be held liable for perjury; (2) refuse to 
answer and be liable for contempt; or (3) answer truthfully and furnish 
inculpatory evidence.45 An additional corollary to the “cruel trilemma” is 
that the government may not use a defendant’s right to silence (including 
a refusal to testify at trial) to assist in the prosecution.46 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has also held that severe threats to an individual’s livelihood are 
sufficiently compulsory to invoke the protections of the Fifth 
Amendment, especially when the government employs the defendant.47 
3. Fifth Amendment Evidence Must Be Incriminating 
In addition to being testimonial and compelled, Fifth Amendment 
protected testimony must also be incriminating. Testimonial evidence 
does not have to “support a conviction under a . . . criminal statute,” but 
must only “furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed.”48 A court may 
also extend Fifth Amendment privileges to statutes superficially 
designated as civil sanctions if the statute’s purpose or intent is 
sufficiently punitive.49 The courts will look to seven factors50 to determine 
if proof exists that the statutory scheme has “transformed what was clearly 
intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.”51 Likewise, the person 
invoking the Fifth Amendment need not be on trial themselves, so long as 
                                                     
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that 
he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be 
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” Id. at 479. 
44. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). 
45. Id. 
46. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 
47. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 76 (1973) (eligibility for government contract); 
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (employment as a police officer); Spevack v. Klein, 
385 U.S. 511, 514 (1966) (disbarment); cf. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 29 (2002) (incentivizing 
admission during voluntary sex offender treatment program); Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 
523 U.S. 272, 276 (1998) (declining to grant parole/clemency for death row inmate following silence 
in response to a question at voluntary interview). 
48. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (citing Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 
(1950)). 
49. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997). 
50. Id. at 99–100; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963). 
51. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956). 
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there exists a reasonable danger of future prosecution;52 even a witness 
proclaiming innocence may assert Fifth Amendment rights and invoke its 
protections.53 The risk of incrimination may not be “of an imaginary and 
unsubstantial character” or “some extraordinary and barely possible 
contingency.”54 
B. Fifth Amendment Protections Are Not Absolute and May Be 
Overcome 
A witness’s or defendant’s testimony, even if compelled, testimonial, 
and incriminating, may still fall outside the scope of Fifth Amendment 
protection. First, a defendant may waive the protections of the Fifth 
Amendment by voluntarily taking the stand as a defense witness.55 A 
defendant or witness may not then invoke the Fifth Amendment upon 
cross-examination “regarding matters made relevant by [their] direct 
examination.”56 Likewise, a witness or defendant who has previously 
failed to invoke Fifth Amendment rights and has given testimony may be 
compelled to repeat such testimony as there is no new risk of incrimination 
or prosecution.57 Additionally, testimony that is compelled but never acted 
upon or offered as inculpatory evidence at trial does not violate a 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights.58 
More importantly for this Comment, even a well-founded and 
reasonable fear of prosecution by a foreign jurisdiction is typically 
disregarded, as the defendant generally cannot invoke the privileges of the 
Fifth Amendment.59 In United States v. Balsys,60 the Court held that a 
defendant may not invoke Fifth Amendment privileges if there is “no 
valid fear of criminal prosecution in this country.”61 In this case, the Court 
                                                     
52. See Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486–87; Blau, 340 U.S. at 161; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 
547, 586 (1891). 
53. Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21–22 (2001) (per curiam). 
54. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896) (citing Queen v. Boyes (1861) 121 Eng. Rep. 730; 
1 B. & S. 311). 
55. Id. 
56. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154 (1958). 
57. See United States v. Allmon, 594 F.3d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 2010). 
58. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990); In re Terrorist Bombings of 
U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 177, 199 (2d Cir. 2008). 
59. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998), rev’g 119 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1997). Both parties 
agreed that the risk of deportation alone is insufficient for asserting Fifth Amendment protections. Id. 
at 671. 
60. 524 U.S. 666 (1998), rev’g 119 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1997). 
61. Id. at 671 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
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held that a resident alien could not refuse to testify about his alleged Nazi 
activities during World War II, despite potentially subjecting him to 
prosecution by the governments of Lithuania, Israel, and Germany.62 
However, the Court suggested that coordinated prosecutorial efforts 
between the United States and foreign nations may develop to the point at 
which the Fifth Amendment becomes applicable.63 
C. Grants of Immunity May Compel Testimony 
The use of involuntary statements or testimony as evidence is strongly 
limited. However, it may be permissible if the defendant or witness is 
given a grant of immunity. 
Courts have firmly maintained that confessions or other statements 
introduced as evidence against a defendant must be voluntary, based on 
both common law64 and judicial precedent.65 In Bram v. United States,66 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that compelled, involuntary confessions 
gathered by Canadian officials could not be used as evidence during a 
trial.67 One hundred thirty years later, the Second Circuit affirmed the 
same principles considered in Bram, holding that compulsory interviews 
and statements provided to the Financial Conduct Authority of the United 
Kingdom,68 and subsequently used by the U.S. Department of Justice 
during prosecution, violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights to 
not serve as a witness against himself.69 As such, claims of voluntariness 
are viewed skeptically, and the issue is most easily circumvented through 
grants of immunity. 
1. There Are Three Types of Immunity Available to Compel Testimony 
If the government considers a witness’s testimony especially relevant 
or necessary, it may compel such testimony by granting statutorily 
                                                     
62. Id. at 670. 
63. Id. 
64. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 545 (1897). 
65. United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 90 (2d Cir. 2017). 
66. 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
67. Bram, 168 U.S. at 565. 
68. Allen, 864 F.3d at 66–68. The defendant’s refusal to testify would have resulted in 
imprisonment in the United Kingdom. Additionally, the defendants were provided direct use 
immunity. Id. at 67–68. However, the requisite derivative use immunity (discussed infra 
section I.C.1) was not provided prior to the compulsory statements. Id. 
69. Id. at 66–68. 
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authorized immunity.70 There exist three types of immunity: (1) use 
immunity; (2) use and derivative use immunity; and (3) transactional 
immunity.71 
First, the government may grant a witness or defendant use immunity. 
Use immunity prohibits the introduction of the specific testimony the court 
or government compels; however, it does not prohibit the exploitation of 
such compelled testimony to seek out additional evidence against the 
witness.72 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that such limited use 
immunity is not coextensive with the protections afforded by the Fifth 
Amendment, and therefore “cannot supplant the privilege, and is not 
sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege.”73 
A second option available is use and derivative use. Contrary to use 
immunity alone, use and derivative use immunity prohibits the 
introduction of any evidence gathered directly from the compelled 
testimony, or subsequently derived either directly or indirectly “from such 
testimony or other information.”74 Such grants of immunity are 
considered coextensive with the protections afforded by the Fifth 
Amendment and are therefore adequate to protect a witness’s rights when 
testimony is compelled.75 Title 18 of the United States Code provides the 
statutory means by which the federal government may grant immunity to 
a witness before either House of Congress, a congressional committee, a 
court, a grand jury, or an agency of the United States.76 If the government 
pursues future prosecution following a grant of this type of immunity, the 
government then assumes a “heavy burden of proving that all of the 
evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent 
sources.”77 
The third, and most extensive, grant of immunity is transactional 
immunity. Unlike the other two types of immunity, transactional 
immunity provides protections broader than those of the Fifth 
Amendment.78 Compared to use and derivative use immunity, which only 
prohibits the direct or indirect use of the testimony provided, 
transactional immunity “accords full immunity from prosecution for the 
                                                     
70. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448 (1972). 
71. Id. at 458. 
72. Id. at 450. 
73. Id. (discussing Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1891)). 
74. Id. at 449 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (2012)). 
75. Id. at 453. 
76. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (immunity generally). 
77. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461–62 (emphasis added). 
78. Id. at 453. 
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offense to which the compelled testimony relates,”79 regardless of the 
source of the evidence sought to be introduced against the defendant. 
Because transactional immunity provides greater protections than the 
Fifth Amendment, it is sufficient to compel the self-incriminating 
testimony of a witness. 
2. Grants of Immunity Are Binding Across Jurisdictions 
The Fourteenth Amendment applies a defendant’s privilege against 
self-incrimination to state proceedings,80 and state grants of immunity 
must still comply with the constitutional limitations articulated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.81 In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York 
Harbor,82 the Court held that “the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal 
as well as state law and a federal witness against incrimination under state 
as well as federal law.”83 In other words, both federal and state prosecutors 
are bound when either grants immunity, and are limited to using evidence 
independent of compelled testimony. The Court considered the “witness 
and Federal Government [to be] in substantially the same position as if 
the witness had claimed his privilege in the absence of a state grant of 
immunity,” without unnecessarily inhibiting the states’ law enforcement 
or investigatory functions.84 
Because of the mutually binding nature of grants of immunity, the 
Department of Justice has implemented an agency-wide policy directing 
U.S. Attorneys to consider potential adverse effects to concurrent 
prosecutions prior to requesting or granting immunity.85 
II. THE COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
UNITED STATES, THE SEVERAL STATES, INDIAN TRIBES, 
AND THE RESPECTIVE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EACH 
Indian tribes, as sovereign entities, preexisted the Constitution and the 
United States. Through treaty making, legislative action, and judicial 
decision, the scope of tribal sovereignty has fluctuated wildly from the 
                                                     
79. Id. 
80. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). 
81. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585–86 (1891). 
82. 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
83. Id. at 77–78. 
84. Id. at 79. 
85. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 720 (2018) [hereinafter CRIMINAL 
RESOURCE MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-720-authorization-
procedure-immunity-requests [https://perma.cc/YAX8-LSUU]. 
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earliest days of interaction to present; so too has congressional and federal 
authority to regulate tribal conduct. Indelibly connected with tribal 
sovereignty, tribal jurisdiction also experienced periods of restriction and 
restoration. Today’s tribal defendants face prosecution in numerous 
tribunals, including tribal, federal, and state court, with no Double 
Jeopardy limits. A push is also underway to provide traditional resolutions 
or apply fundamental Indian law to tribal cases and continue jurisdictional 
reversion to tribal courts. 
A. A Brief History of Indian Sovereignty and Intervention by the 
Federal Government 
There are 567 federally recognized tribes within the national 
boundaries of the United States.86 These tribes are located on and exercise 
jurisdiction over Indian country; Indian country includes reservations, 
allotments, and dependent Indian communities.87 A federally recognized 
tribe is an entity that has “a government-to-government relationship with 
the United States . . . .”88 Further, federally recognized tribes are 
understood to have “certain inherent rights of self-government (i.e., tribal 
sovereignty),”89 each entitled to a “special brand of sovereignty.”90 
Early interactions between the government of the United States and 
Native American tribes demonstrated (at least superficial) respect for the 
sovereignty of the tribes and Indian nations.91 In early decisions, the U.S. 
Supreme Court recognized “those semi-independent tribes whom our 
government has always recognized as exempt from our laws . . . and, in 
regard to their domestic government, left to their own rules and 
traditions.”92 Absent an explicit treaty provision or federal statute to the 
contrary, Indian crime committed against other Indians was beyond the 
jurisdiction of federal and state courts.93 
Furthermore, in the absence of limited examples of delegation, 
Congress reserved jurisdiction over Indian affairs to the federal 
                                                     
86. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the Unites States Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, 83 Fed. Reg. 4235, 4235 (Jan. 30, 2018). 
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) (defining Indian country). 
88. Frequently Asked Questions: What Is a Federally Recognized Tribe?, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR 
INDIAN AFFS., https://www.bia.gov/frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/CFS6-AEZY]. 
89. Id. 
90. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 800 (2014). 
91. See Robert Anderson, Negotiating Jurisdiction: Retroceding State Authority Over Indian 
Country Granted by Public Law 280, 87 WASH. L. REV. 915, 920 (2012). 
92. United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 617 (1877). 
93. See generally Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
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government.94 The Court explicitly rejected state attempts to exercise 
jurisdiction over the conduct of non-Indians in Indian country.95 The 
foundational principles for these holdings were three-fold: (1) that Indian 
tribes “possess certain incidents of preexisting sovereignty”; (2) that this 
“sovereignty is subject to diminution or elimination” only by the federal 
government and not the states; and (3) that the “limited sovereignty and 
their corresponding dependency upon the United States for protection” 
imposed a responsibility on the federal government.96 
Despite these claims and original principles, both legislative and 
judicial action further curtailed tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction. In 
1871, the federal government stopped making treaties with the tribes, 
effectively ending tribal consent to the form of the tribes’ relationship 
with the federal government.97 In passing the General Allotment Act of 
1887,98 Congress assigned individual parcels to members of Indian tribes, 
abrogating the traditional model of community ownership and “returning” 
approximately 110 million acres of “surplus” territory to public (i.e., non-
Indian) ownership.99 Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Ex 
parte Crow Dog, and in response to the perceived inadequacy of the 
traditional tribal means of conflict resolution,100 Congress passed the 
Major Crimes Act (MCA).101 This statute granted to the federal courts 
jurisdiction over Indians who committed any of the enumerated crimes 
against other Indians in Indian Country.102 
These legislative actions, specifically the MCA, were upheld as a 
proper exercise of Congress’ plenary powers over the tribes.103 Because 
of the tribes’ apparent dependence on the government of the United States, 
the Court described the tribes as “wards of the nation.”104 The Court held 
that “[t]he power of the General Government over [the tribes] . . . is 
necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom 
                                                     
94. See Anderson, supra note 91, at 929. 
95. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 562 (1832) (invalidating a Georgia statute 
requiring non-Indians to have a state license to live on Indian land). 
96. CONFERENCE OF WASH. ATT’YS GEN., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK § 1:1, at 7–8 
(2017); DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 5, at 39. 
97. Anderson, supra note 91, at 921. 
98. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.). 
99. Anderson, supra note 91, at 921. 
100. Id. at 925–26. 
101. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012)). 
102. Id. (listing seven crimes; later amended to enumerate thirteen separate crimes). 
103. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1886). 
104. Id. at 382, 383. 
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they dwell.”105 This plenary power is recognized and upheld as a “broad 
congressional authority to impose federal policy directly on tribes without 
their consent,”106 especially with regards to “health, safety, and morals 
within Indian country.”107 Congress also limited the sentencing authority 
of the tribal courts, statutorily capping any sentence to one-year 
imprisonment and a five thousand dollar fine.108 
B. The Shifting Scope of Tribal Jurisdiction 
From the 1970s to early 2000s, the existing understanding of the Indian 
tribes’ exclusive jurisdiction was limited by a series of court decisions, 
while legislative efforts to circumscribe tribal authority were judicially 
upheld. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe,109 the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that Indian tribes do not have jurisdiction over non-tribal defendants for 
crimes committed in Indian country.110 The Court also held in a separate 
case that the tribes also could not regulate hunting and fishing activities 
by non-tribal members on land owned in fee simple by non-Indians, even 
if such land fell within the boundaries of the tribal reservation.111 In Strate 
v. A-1 Contractors,112 the Court denied tribal jurisdiction over the civil 
claims of two non-tribal parties, arising out of conduct occurring on a state 
highway, on land transferred through a federal lease which crossed 
through an Indian reservation.113 The Court also rejected a claim of civil 
jurisdiction over state officials who entered onto reservation land to 
execute a state search warrant.114 
Despite these reductions in jurisdiction, recent legislative efforts and 
judicial decisions are again extending the scope of tribal courts. First, in 
Lara, the Court upheld a federal statute permitting tribal jurisdiction over 
any member of any federally recognized tribe, even if the defendant is not 
a member of the tribe hearing the case.115 Additionally, the Court 
reaffirmed that the Double Jeopardy Clause posed no obstacle to 
                                                     
105. Id. at 384. 
106. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5-02, at 391 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) 
[hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]. 
107. Id. 
108. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012). 
109. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
110. Id. at 195. 
111. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566–67 (1981). 
112. 520 U.S. 438 (1997). 
113. Id. at 442. 
114. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 374 (2001). 
115. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004). 
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prosecutions under both tribal and federal law.116 Recent legislation, such 
as the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act (VAWA 2013)117 
and the Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA),118 have also increased tribal 
authority. For example, VAWA 2013 includes provisions extending the 
jurisdiction of tribal courts to non-Indians, specifically in the context of 
domestic violence prosecutions.119 Further, TLOA extended tribal 
sentencing authority by permitting the “stacking” of numerous charges, 
resulting in an effective sentence of nine years imprisonment and a fifteen 
thousand dollar fine.120 
C. Concurrent Jurisdiction and the Intervention of Federal and State 
Courts in Tribal Matters 
When tribal members are not physically located in Indian country, they 
are subject to the jurisdiction of both the state and federal governments. 
However, even within the boundaries of Indian country, tribal members 
may be subject to the jurisdiction of the tribes, the federal government, 
and the state.121 For example, although “tribal powers may not be limited 
by implication”122 and “concurrent tribal jurisdiction over matters covered 
by federal criminal statutes is not preempted,”123 tribal members still 
remain subject to federal jurisdiction under the MCA124 and the Indian 
Country Crimes Act (ICCA).125 Additionally, some lower courts have 
held that “the United States has jurisdiction over some general federal 
criminal laws within Indian country”126 and that such “general crimes 
have a nationwide scope and therefore should reach into Indian 
country.”127 
                                                     
116. Id. at 210. 
117. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, tit. IX, 127 Stat. 
54, 118–26 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 25, and 42 U.S.C.). 
118. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, tit. II, 124 Stat. 2258, 2261–301 
(codified in scattered sections of 25 and 42 U.S.C.). 
119. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 § 904 (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 1304 
(Supp. III 2015)). 
120. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 § 234 (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012)). 
121. See generally Anderson, supra note 91, at 924, 926, 930. 
122. Id. at 927. 
123. Id. 
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012). Indian defendants are therefore accountable for the fourteen 
enumerated crimes (murder, arson, etc.). Id. 
125. Id. § 1152 (assimilating state law crimes through the Assimilative Crimes Act). 
126. Anderson, supra note 91, at 926. 
127. Id. 
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The line of reasoning employed by the U.S. Supreme Court in United 
States v. Kagama,128 upholding Congress’s plenary authority to pass the 
MCA,129 has yet to be overruled. In fact, the Court recently affirmed 
Congress’s “broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian 
tribes.”130 The same general legislative attitude, as well as efforts to 
terminate the federal trust relationship,131 brought about the passage of 
Public Law 83-280 (PL 280).132 Congress exercised its plenary power, 
mandating that some states assume jurisdiction over certain crimes 
committed within Indian country; other states were presented the option 
to assume jurisdiction.133 PL 280 requires six states to assert criminal, and 
some civil, jurisdiction over Indian country located within the respective 
state borders; other states could assert criminal and civil jurisdiction 
unilaterally.134 
In United States v. Wheeler,135 the Court held that prosecution under 
both tribal and federal statutes did not implicate Double Jeopardy.136 First, 
the tribes retained inherent powers to prosecute tribal members despite the 
tribes’ dependent status with the federal government.137 Second, because 
a “separate sovereign” brought each prosecution, the prosecution is not 
“for the same offence.”138 The Ninth Circuit further refined this holding. 
Acquittal under the MCA, the court held, did not prevent subsequent 
prosecution by a tribal court for the same crime under a tribal statute.139 
This application of the “separate sovereigns” doctrine to the tribes is 
consistent with the Court’s application of the doctrine to the states. In 
                                                     
128. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
129. Id. at 384–85; supra section II.A. 
130. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200–06 (2004) (offering six distinct points of discussion 
for the basis of Congress’s authority). 
131. Anderson, supra note 91, at 922. 
132. State Jurisdiction over Criminal Offenses (PL 280), Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1322, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012)). 
133. Id. Recall the Court’s holding in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), that the states had 
no jurisdiction within the boundaries of a reservation under the contemporaneous jurisprudence and 
law. Id. at 562; supra text accompanying note 95. PL 280 legislatively overruled this precedent. 
134. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a); Anderson, supra note 91, at 930. See WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12 (2018) 
as an example of Washington State’s assertion of jurisdiction over tribal matters. Note also that the 
optional assumption of jurisdiction has been revoked, and states may request the United States accept 
a retrocession of previously assumed jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. § 1323. 
135. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
136. Id. at 329–30. 
137. Id. at 332. 
138. Id. at 330. 
139. Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 826 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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Abbate v. United States,140 the Court held that a state conviction does not 
bar prosecution under a federal statute.141 Further, states may prosecute 
individuals previously charged under federal law.142 Successive 
prosecutions by tribal, state, or federal courts are not barred as each 
government is a separate sovereign, and the respective courts are not 
“emanating” from the same sovereign.143 
It is important to note that the U.S. Supreme Court recently held oral 
arguments in the case of Gamble v. United States144; the sole question 
presented is whether the “separate sovereigns” exception to the Double 
Jeopardy Clause should be overruled.145 The Native Indigenous Women’s 
Resource Center (NIWRC) and National Congress of American Indians 
(NCAI) has strongly opposed such a holding.146 The NIWRC and NCAI 
contend that eliminating the “separate sovereigns” exception would “only 
further perpetuate the crisis Native women and children now face,”147 as 
meaningful and sufficient punishment of domestic violence offenders 
requires the availability of federal prosecution in addition to tribal 
sanctions.148 Arguably, tribes would be left with two choices: (1) wait for 
a decision on federal prosecution, potentially exceeding the tribal statute 
of limitations, or (2) bring tribal charges (with limited sentencing) to the 
exclusion of federal prosecution.149 Furthermore, NIWRC and NCAI 
argue that any disruption of the “separate sovereigns” exception should 
not extend to tribal prosecutions, as the Double Jeopardy Clause is a 
federal constitutional question and is therefore inapplicable.150 
Additionally, the incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause in ICRA is 
                                                     
140. 359 U.S. 187 (1959). 
141. Id. at 196. However, see the Department of Justice’s “Petite Policy,” articulating several 
factors and considerations prior to commencing a prosecution of an individual who has proceeded 
through the criminal justice process in a state court. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-
2.031 (2018) [hereinafter JUSTICE MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-2000-authority-us-
attorney-criminal-division-mattersprior-approvals#9-2.031 [https://perma.cc/2TQ7-26L8]. 
142. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 139 (1959). 
143. Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 264 (1937) (permitting concurrent territorial and 
federal anti-trust law). 
144. 694 F. App’x 750 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018) (No. 
17-646). 
145. Brief for Petitioner at i, Gamble v. United States, No. 17-646 (U.S. Sept. 4, 2018). 
146. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Indigenous Women’s Resource Center & National Congress 
of American Indians in Support of Respondent at 10, Gamble v. United States, No. 17-646 (U.S. Nov. 
1, 2018). 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 16. 
149. Id. at 17. 
150. Id. at 27.  
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arguably limited only to duplicative tribal prosecutions, as it does not 
explicitly bar subsequent state or federal prosecution.151 
Ultimately, while a positive result for the petitioner in Gamble may 
have momentous implications on tribal prosecutions, it does not resolve 
the question of what standard should be applied to ICRA provisions 
mirroring the Bill of Rights. 
D. Contemporaneous Efforts to Apply Traditional Methods or 
Fundamental Indian Law to Tribal Jurisdictions and to Revert 
Control of Tribal Systems to Indian Tribes 
Traditional tribal punishments, remedies, and purpose are significantly 
different from Anglo-Saxon criminal justice systems.152 Tribal 
fundamental law is “something that existed before Western style courts 
and [is] something that still exists beyond the court setting.”153 Because 
tribes are sovereign, they are not only empowered and entitled to 
“[administer] justice for the community,” but are also responsible for it.154 
Before the imposition of European and American standards of justice 
on tribal courts, one of the most essential functions exercised by a tribal 
government “involved the resolution of disputes among tribal 
members.”155 Compared to a contemporary focus on guilt and 
punishment, the “primary goal was simply to mediate the case to 
everyone’s satisfaction.”156 Although a chief, elder, or other leader was 
generally responsible for the proceeding, the parties had to “discuss the 
problem until a satisfactory compromise or solution could be agreed 
upon.”157 The peace and functioning of the tribe remained the overarching 
goal, even though the tribe might also punish an offender (up to and 
including banishment or death).158 
                                                     
151. Id. at 28 (discussing 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(3) (2012)); see also Robert Berry, Civil Liberties 
Constraints on Tribal Sovereignty After the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 1 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 26 
(1993) (“Congress was deliberate in the silences it left in ICRA.”). 
152. CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 16 (Jerry 
Gardner ed., 2004). 
153. April L. Wilkinson, A Framework for Understanding Tribal Courts and the Application of 
Fundamental Law: Through the Voices of Scholars in the Field of Tribal Justice, 15 TRIBAL L.J. 67, 
69–70 (2015). 
154. Id. at 71. 
155. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 5, at 111. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 112. 
158. GARROW & DEER, supra note 152, at 16–18. 
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Application of modern constitutional law, especially Fifth Amendment 
protections, is further complicated by a difference in cultural values 
between many Indian philosophies of justice and the Anglo-American 
judicial system.159 For example, some cultures such as the Mohawk, 
banished members who were found guilty a third time of lying or 
minimizing their own culpable behavior.160 The tribe imposed a “cultural 
requirement of full disclosure” entirely contrary to an Anglo-American 
right to remain silent in order to support rehabilitation and the integrity of 
the community as a whole.161 
As tribal justice systems continue to develop, each has adopted a 
unique format.162 Some courts implement Anglo-American formats, to 
include trained lawyers and judges practicing adversarial law in 
courtrooms, with an emphasis on, and incorporation of, fundamental 
law.163 Tribal fundamental law is defined as the “tradition, customs, [and] 
tribal values” incorporated into a tribal court.164 Others offer a mix of 
Western and traditional Indian forums, staffing both adversarial criminal 
courts and dispute resolution venues.165 The third type of tribal system 
relies solely on traditional methods and fundamental laws, to the point a 
written code may not be available.166 
Efforts are currently underway to facilitate a continued transfer of 
responsibility and authority to the tribal courts.167 Government 
committees,168 tribal organizations,169 and academics170 champion these 
efforts. Recommendations include the return of jurisdiction assumed as a 
product of PL 280,171 substantial increases in funding for tribal justice 
                                                     
159. Id. at 243. 
160. Id. at 244. 
161. Id. 
162. See generally Wilkinson, supra note 153, at 69–80. 
163. Id. at 76. 
164. Id. at 70. 
165. Id. at 78. 
166. Id. 
167. See generally INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE AMERICA 
SAFER: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (2013) [hereinafter 
INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N]. 
168. Id. 
169. INDIGENOUS PEACEMAKING INITIATIVE, https://peacemaking.narf.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/8RJV-GBVE]. 
170. INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, supra note 167; Anderson, supra note 91. 
171. The optional and unilateral assumption of jurisdiction by states was repealed with the passage 
of ICRA. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 106, § 1-07. 
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systems,172 and the creation of a separate U.S. Court of Indian Appeals.173 
Likewise, courts have adopted a policy to engage in statutory 
interpretation in favor of tribal sovereignty in the case of federal statutes 
with ambiguous congressional intent that impose upon tribal rights, 
systems, or laws.174 
III. THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND JUDICIALLY 
IMPOSED FEDERAL UNDERSTANDING OF INDIAN 
RIGHTS 
Congress passed ICRA in 1968, and statutorily mandated the 
application of certain fundamental rights to tribal defendants. Many of 
these rights are similar to or verbatim from the Bill of Rights, yet courts 
across tribal, federal, and state jurisdictions disagree as to the proper 
standard of analysis and the applicability of federal precedent in 
interpreting constitutional rights. 
A. Judicial and Legislative History Leading to the Adoption of the 
ICRA 
Assuming tribal members meet federal standards for citizenship,175 as 
well as the membership requirements of a federally recognized tribe,176 
Indians are simultaneous citizens of three distinct and sovereign entities: 
the tribe, the state, and the United States.177 However, within Indian 
country, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not apply to the actions 
of tribal governments.178 In fact, because tribes pre-date the signing of the 
Constitution, it is not binding and tribes retain their “historic sovereign 
authority.”179 However, tribes that wish to implement similar rights may 
                                                     
172. INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, supra note 167, at xiv–xv, xvii–xix, xxiii–xxiv. 
173. Id. at 23–24. 
174. See generally Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M., 458 U.S. 832 (1982); 
McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
175. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, § 233, 43 Stat. 
253. 
176. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 52–55, 52 n.2 (1978) (affirming District 
Court’s emphasis on the importance of tribal control over membership requirements); Roff v. Burney, 
168 U.S. 218, 223 (1897). 
177. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 5, at 217–18. 
178. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do apply 
to the actions of state and federal government actors exercising lawful jurisdiction within Indian 
country. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 371 (2001). 
179. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014). 
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do so in tribal constitutions, or Congress may exercise its plenary powers 
to impose such rights statutorily.180 
In an effort described as a push to “grant the American Indians the 
rights which are secured to other Americans,”181 Senator Sam Ervin 
became the chief sponsor of ICRA.182 Over a seven-year period, Senator 
Ervin held hearings to address a long line of court cases affirming the 
inapplicability of the Constitution to the tribes.183 In Santa Clara Pueblo 
v. Martinez,184 the U.S. Supreme Court engaged in an extensive review of 
the legislative history of ICRA, finding Congressional intent to “promote 
the well-established federal policy of further Indian self-government” and 
protecting “tribal sovereignty from undue influence.”185 The Court also 
held that extending an unenumerated remedy beyond habeas corpus was 
“not plainly required to give effect to Congress’ objective of extending 
constitutional norms to tribal self-government.”186 In conducting its own 
review of the legislative history, the Ninth Circuit cited with approval the 
statements of Representative Benjamin Reifel,187 that “habeas corpus 
under ICRA ‘would assure effective enforcement of . . . fundamental trial 
rights’ that arise in the criminal context, including the prohibition on 
double jeopardy, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to 
confront witnesses.”188 
B. Protections Afforded by ICRA, and the Judicial Review Available 
for Violations 
Much of the language of the ICRA is similar, though not necessarily 
identical, to that of the Bill of Rights. In relevant part, ICRA provides that 
“[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government 
shall . . . compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against 
                                                     
180. Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 869–70 (9th Cir. 2017). 
181. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 106, § 1-07. 
182. Id.  
183. Id. 
184. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
185. Id. at 62–63. 
186. Id. at 65. 
187. Representative Reifel was a Representative for the state of South Dakota from 1961 to 1971. 
Representative Reifel was born on the Rosebud Indian Reservation in South Dakota and was an area 
administrator with the Bureau of Indian Affairs prior to his political career. Biographical Directory 
of the United States Congress, 1774–Present, Reifel, Benjamin, (1906 - 1990), U.S. CONG. 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=R000152 [https://perma.cc/ETQ4-
XDWY]. 
188. Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 873 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 114 CONG. REC. 9611 
(1968)). 
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himself.”189 Additional rights protected by ICRA include freedom of 
speech, protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, and 
protection against takings without compensation.190 
However, unlike the federal judicial system, the only means of 
achieving a remedy for violations of ICRA rest within the tribal justice 
systems,191 or upon a writ of habeas corpus.192 In Martinez, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that only habeas corpus suits permitted federal review 
of tribal court holdings.193 According to the Court, tribal sovereign 
immunity barred an action against the tribe itself and was not limited by 
an exercise of Congress’ plenary power.194 Likewise, action against tribal 
officials is not coextensive with the remedies available against state or 
federal officers, such as an Ex parte Young claim, due to the unique 
relationship between the United States and tribes.195 In the absence of 
express authorization, the Court declined to imply an additional federal 
cause of action beyond habeas review. The Ninth Circuit further narrowed 
the availability of review, holding that initiation of federal habeas corpus 
review required actual detention, rather than the broader understanding of 
custody used in federal courts.196 
C. Imposed Federal Understandings of Indian Rights and the 
Application of Constitutional Precedent 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not resolved the issue of what precedent 
to apply to (nearly) identical language between ICRA and the 
Constitution. As such, it has fallen to the lower federal courts to determine 
the constitutional boundaries of ICRA; in the process, these courts have 
imposed a federal perspective and precedent on laws and rights solely 
applicable to the Indian tribes. 
Relying heavily on the nearly identical nature of the search and seizure 
language, both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits of Appeals have applied 
Fourth Amendment precedent to ICRA’s protections against unreasonable 
                                                     
189. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4) (2012); cf. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”). 
190. 25 U.S.C. § 1302. 
191. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978). 
192. 25 U.S.C. § 1303. 
193. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 67. 
194. Id. at 58–59. For an extensive discussion on the scope and origins of tribal immunity, see Seth 
W.R. Brickey, Comment, Rent a Tribe: Using Tribal Immunity to Shield Patents from Administrative 
Review, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1455–74 (2018). 
195. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 71. 
196. Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 872–73, 877 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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searches and seizures.197 For example, in United States v. Clifford,198 the 
Eighth Circuit applied a federal reasonableness standard to the search and 
seizure conducted by tribal police officers arresting a tribal member on a 
reservation, prior to the defendant’s prosecution in federal court.199 As in 
Clifford, the parties in United States v. Becerra-Garcia200 briefed the case 
as a Fourth Amendment matter, although the violation was committed by 
tribal rangers on tribal land.201 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit proceeded 
“under well developed Fourth Amendment precedent, which nets the 
same result as an analysis under ICRA.”202 
The courts of appeals have also applied federal constitutional standards 
to due process violation claims. The Ninth Circuit held in Randall v. 
Yakima Nation Tribal Court203 that, so long as the criminal procedures of 
a tribe do not “differ significantly from those ‘commonly employed in 
Anglo-Saxon society[,]’ . . . federal constitutional standards are employed 
in determining whether the challenged procedure violates the Act.”204 
Directly citing the Ninth Circuit opinion in Randall, the Sixth Circuit held 
in accord that ICRA’s due process protections required application of U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent establishing the protection of fair notice.205 
D. Various Tribal Courts Apply Federal Fifth Amendment Law to 
ICRA Self-Incrimination 
In interpreting ICRA’s self-incrimination protections, several tribal 
courts have looked to the tribal statutes requiring rights advisements and 
analyzed them under a Fifth Amendment lens.206 For example, in Quileute 
                                                     
197. United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Clifford, 664 F.2d 1090, 1091 n.3 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Lester, 647 F.2d 869, 872 (8th Cir. 
1981). 
198. 664 F.2d 1090 (8th Cir. 1981). 
199. Id. at 1092 (applying an “expectation of privacy” test to the case at hand). The court did note 
that while both parties’ arguments addressed Fourth Amendment concerns, ICRA was the controlling 
law; the distinction was ultimately irrelevant, however, as the analysis was the same pursuant to 
Lester. Id. at 1091 n.3. 
200. 397 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). 
201. Id. at 1171. 
202. Id. (“[T]he Indian Civil Rights Act . . . imposes an ‘identical limitation’ on tribal government 
conduct as the Fourth Amendment.” (citation omitted)). 
203. 841 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1988). 
204. Id. at 900. 
205. Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 864 (6th Cir. 2016). 
206. Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at Thirty Years, 
34 IDAHO L. REV. 465, 499 (1998). 
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Tribe v. LeClair,207 the tribal court held procedural due process required 
a defendant to not only have certain rights, but also “reasonably 
understand those rights and have reasonable opportunities to exercise 
those rights.”208 The same court also recognized in Southern Ute v. 
Henry209 that the Fifth Amendment, while inapplicable to the tribes 
directly, did share language with the relevant tribal statute provision that 
“is almost identical.”210 Likewise, the court looked to the Fifth 
Amendment and Miranda when analyzing the “Tribe’s code provisions 
that address the issue of proper warnings where a person is subjected to a 
custodial interrogation.”211 The Chippewa-Ottawa Conservation Court 
also looked to Miranda as a guide in interpreting ICRA and tribal 
statutes.212 Ultimately, even assuming that Miranda and related precedent 
were binding, the court held rights advisements were not required for 
adjudication of major civil infractions.213 
The Fort Peck Court of Appeals was much more explicit about the 
coextensive nature of the Fifth Amendment and ICRA’s self-
incrimination protections. In Fort Peck Tribes v. Bighorn,214 the court held 
that both the Fifth Amendment and ICRA mandated that law enforcement, 
when taking tribal members into custody, advise those defendants of tribal 
rights.215 The court also looked directly to the U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent to determine whether the defendant in the case was “‘in 
custody’ for purposes of receiving [Miranda] protection.”216 The Supreme 
Court of the Muskogee (Creek) Nation also held that, under the U.S. 
Constitution, ICRA, and the tribal code, asking a defendant under oath 
about Indian enrollment status violated the privilege against self-
                                                     
207. 1 NICS App. 50 (Quileute Tribal Ct. App. 1989). 
208. Id. at 54. 
209. 15 NICS App. 35 (Southern Ute Tribal Ct. App. 2017) (per curiam). 
210. Id. at 38. 
211. Id.; accord Lower Elwha Klallam Indian Tribe v. Bolstrom, 19 Indian L. Rep. 6026, 6027 
(Lower Elwha Klallam Ct. App. 1991) (describing the tribal statute as “essentially a statutory list of 
the decision of Miranda v. Arizona” and then applying U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit 
precedent as guidance to determine the proper remedy). 
212. Chippewa-Ottawa Tribes v. Payment, Jr., 18 Indian L. Rep. 6141, 6141 (Chippewa-Ottawa 
Conservation Ct. 1991). 
213. Id. at 6141–42. 
214. No. 279, 1999 Mont. Fort Peck Tribe LEXIS 4 (Fort Peck Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1999). 
215. Id. at *4. 
216. Id.; accord Southern Ute Tribe v. Lansing, 19 Indian L. Rep. 6091, 6092 (Southern Ute Tribal 
Ct. 1992) (applying U.S. Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent to the statutory language of “in 
custody”). 
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incrimination.217 This is because tribal enrollment is a necessary element 
for jurisdiction and prosecution.218 
However, not all tribal courts agree that Miranda warnings are 
necessary under ICRA. For example, in Chippewa-Ottawa v. Payment 
Jr.,219 the court left open the possibility that Miranda warnings are not 
required by ICRA, even while assuming Miranda applied to rule against 
the defendant.220 Other tribal courts have taken a more middle of the road 
approach. The Crow Court of Appeals recognized that Miranda is not 
binding, but also noted that the Ninth Circuit precedent in Randall would 
suggest applying the federal constitutional law in analyzing ICRA’s self-
incrimination clause.221 Instead, the court chose to forego applying ICRA 
to the case at hand and instead resolved the issue more narrowly by 
reviewing “the intent of the Tribal Council in enacting the requirement for 
Miranda warnings under Tribal law.”222 
E. Accepting the Binding Nature of Grants of Immunity Across Tribal, 
State and Federal Courts 
Although rare, some courts have considered the effect of grants of 
immunity on cross-jurisdictional prosecutions involving tribal courts. In 
In re Long Visitor,223 the Indian appellants were held in contempt by a 
district court for failing to testify before a federal grand jury investigating 
the shooting death of three people on the Pine Ridge Reservation, 
including two Federal Bureau of Investigation agents.224 The appellants 
were twice granted use immunity in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 6003, 
and twice refused to testify.225 After being remanded to the custody of the 
U.S. Marshals, the appellants filed their appeal, arguing that the grant of 
immunity was inadequate to protect them from future use of their grand 
jury testimony in tribal court prosecutions.226 The Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals dismissed the defendants’ claim as premature and speculative; 
                                                     
217. Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Johnson, SC 11-13, 2013 Muscogee Creek Nation Sup. LEXIS 
2, at *32–33 (Muscogee (Creek) Nation Sup. Ct. Aug. 15, 2013). 
218. Id. at *31–32. 
219. 18 Indian L. Rep. 6141 (Chippewa-Ottawa Conservation Ct. 1991). 
220. Id. at 6141. 
221. Crow Tribe v. Big Man, No. 00-410, 2000 Mont. Crow Tribe LEXIS 5, at *19–26 (Crow Ct. 
App. Oct. 12, 2000). 
222. Id. at *29. 
223. 523 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1975). 
224. Id. at 444. 
225. Id. at 445. 
226. Id. at 445–46. 
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however, the court also implied that the tribal courts would not be able to 
use compelled testimony because ICRA “expressly protects an Indian 
from self-incrimination.”227 
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Arizona suggested in dicta that, 
because the language of ICRA mirrors that of the Fifth Amendment, the 
non-Indian petitioner would be able to invoke a privilege coextensive with 
the Bill of Rights during testimony in a tribal court.228 In Tracy v. Superior 
Court of Maricopa County,229 although the Navajo court could not 
criminally try the non-Indian petitioner, the tribe nevertheless sought to 
compel his testimony in a different criminal case.230 Upon request from 
the tribal court and pursuant to an applicable state statute, the state 
superior court ordered the petitioner to appear before the Navajo Nation 
court.231 The petitioner claimed that his testimony as a witness in a Navajo 
court would provide incriminating evidence for a pending federal 
prosecution against him.232 The petitioner also contended that the 
protections of ICRA against self-incrimination are inferior to state and 
federal safeguards.233 The Supreme Court of Arizona emphasized that 
those “provisions of the ICRA that clearly mirror the federal provisions in 
language and intent . . . have been interpreted under the federal standard 
and are generally held to be identical to their federal counterparts”234; 
accordingly, the court held that ICRA “could not be interpreted to provide 
any lesser protection.”235 The court hypothesized that the petitioner would 
“enjoy a federally imposed privilege against self-incrimination that is 
substantially coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege” and the 
tribal court could not compel the petitioner’s testimony “without a grant 
of use and derivative use immunity sufficient to meet the dictates of the 
fifth amendment.”236 
At least one tribal court has squarely addressed the issue of previous 
grants of immunity by non-tribal jurisdictions. In Navajo Nation v. 
MacDonald Jr.,237 the Navajo Nation prosecuted the defendant following 
                                                     
227. Id. at 447. 
228. Tracy v. Superior Court of Maricopa Cty., 810 P.2d 1030, 1048 (Ariz. 1991). 
229. 810 P.2d 1030 (Ariz. 1991). 
230. Id. at 1033. 
231. Id. at 1033–34. 
232. Id. at 1046. 
233. Id. at 1047. 
234. Id. at 1047–48. 
235. Id. at 1048. 
236. Id. 
237. 19 Indian L. Rep. 6079 (Navajo Nation Sup. Ct. 1992).  
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televised and otherwise publicly broadcasted immunized testimony before 
a congressional committee.238 First, the court held that the tribal 
prosecutor failed to prove to the court that evidence used in prosecuting 
the trial was not directly based on or derived from the defendant’s 
immunized testimony.239 Second, the court determined that this failure 
violated the defendant’s due process rights articulated in the Navajo 
Nation Bill of Rights.240 Relying on the concept that “[t]he right against 
self-incrimination is fundamental” and is a Navajo principle espoused in 
tribal law, the court affirmatively designated the safeguards articulated in 
Kastigar v. United States241 as the appropriate standard by which to 
evaluate prosecutions following immunized testimony.242 
F. Academic and Tribal Resistance to Adopting Federal Standards of 
Analysis for ICRA Violations. 
As previously identified, the voluminous U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights are merely “a guide in Indian 
country, not the law,” and may be followed or ignored at will by tribal 
courts.243 The Court has recognized the “definite trend by tribal courts 
toward the view that they have leeway in interpreting the 
ICRA’s . . . clauses and need not follow the U.S. Supreme Court 
precedents jot-for-jot.”244 Likewise, tribal courts are free to apply ICRA 
to provide “essential fairness” consistent with tribal traditions and 
circumstances.245 
Some commentators suggest that the ambiguous deference to tribal 
courts in interpreting the provisions of ICRA has both failed to protect the 
constitutional rights of Indians and failed to empower tribes to protect 
civil rights.246 Professor Robert Porter posited that the provisions of ICRA 
                                                     
238. MacDonald Jr., 19 Indian L. Rep. at 6083–84. Interestingly, this was the case for which the 
petitioner in Tracy v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, discussed supra notes 228–236, was 
compelled to testify. 
239. Id. at 6084. 
240. Id.  
241. 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972). 
242. MacDonald Jr., 19 Indian L. Rep. at 6084. 
243. GARROW & DEER, supra note 152, at 248. 
244. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring). 
245. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 106, § 14-04 n.63. 
246. Note, ICRA Reconsidered: New Interpretations of Familiar Rights, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 
1720 (2016) (“[I]f Congress instead is trying to empower tribes to protect civil rights in their own 
way, the uncertainty surrounding ICRA is causing tribes to hesitate and some federal courts to return 
to federal jurisprudence as a guide to ICRA’s provisions.”). 
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were an intentional and not so subtle continuation of Congress’s “100-
year attack on traditional methods of governance and dispute resolution” 
by shifting a tribal court’s focus to the individual and away from the 
community.247 Application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent would only 
further impose “the strictures of Anglo-American law.”248 Additional 
suggestions include the idea that federal courts, despite the similarity in 
language to the Bill of Rights, decline to follow federal understandings of 
constitutional rights; rather, the court should ensure that tribal “practice 
accords with a permissible understanding” of that right.249 This approach 
is arguably consistent with tribal culture and supports the idea of comity; 
the sovereign nature of the tribes also supports such latitude.250 Further, 
as noted in Harvard Law Review, permitting federal interpretation of 
ICRA in federal court and tribal interpretation of ICRA in tribal court 
leaves tribes with three stark choices: impose shorter sentences “to 
maintain their tribal rights and distinctions, adapt to federal standards, or 
have their judgments vacated by the federal government.”251 
IV. THE SELF-INCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS OF ICRA 
SHOULD BE ANALYZED UNDER, AND HELD AS CO-
EXTENSIVE WITH, FIFTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 
Application of federal Fifth Amendment precedent is necessary to 
ensure a degree of predictability and consistency between tribal, federal, 
and state courts in hearing the cases of tribal defendants. Further, tribal 
court decisions have demonstrated a willingness to adopt a uniform 
standard of analysis, as well as compatibility between federal precedent 
and tribes utilizing an Anglo-American trial system. The availability of 
habeas corpus review by a federal court also recommends applying a 
consistent federal standard to self-incrimination protections. Lastly, even 
without changes to the current analysis, tribal prosecution poses a 
                                                     
247. Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the Anglo-
American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, 272 
(1997); see also Hayley Weedn, Stay Out of the Cookie Jar: Revisiting Martinez to Explain Why the 
U.S. Should Keep Its Hands out of Tribal Constitutionalism and Internal Self-Governance, 20 
WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 18, 41–43 (2012). 
248. Porter, supra note 247, at 272. 
249. Note, supra note 246, at 1723. 
250. Id. at 1724–28. See also Berry, supra note 151, at 31 (rejecting efforts at expanding the 
jurisdiction of federal courts to hear ICRA claims as “no clearer path lies to furthering [Congress’s] 
dual interests in tribal sovereignty and civil liberties than in allowing the tribal courts to develop an 
autonomous body of civil liberties law that can synthesize tribal principles with the principles 
embodied in the Constitution”). 
251. Note, supra note 246, at 1724. 
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sufficient risk to a defendant’s liberty to warrant self-incrimination 
protections in other courts. 
A. Broad Tribal Jurisdiction Demonstrates the Need for a Uniform 
and Consistent Interpretation of ICRA’s Protections 
There are more than 560 tribal nations within the United States of 
America,252 and each tribe is entitled (but not required) to create its own 
constitution and criminal justice system.253 Each constitution is unique, 
varied, and does not necessarily extend the same explicit protections to 
tribal members.254 As a remedy, ICRA purported to extend basic 
constitutional protections to tribal defendants. However, each tribal court 
remains free to interpret and apply ICRA’s protections as it deems 
appropriate, resulting in a patchwork of “constitutional” protections. 
While this may have been an initially acceptable and workable state of 
affairs, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lara and the passage by 
Congress of the VAWA 2013 demands the application of a singular 
standard. 
In Lara, the Court upheld Congress’s plenary power to extend tribal 
court jurisdiction to any enrolled member of any federally recognized 
tribe.255 The Court also held that Double Jeopardy did not apply to 
prosecutions under both federal and tribal law.256 While defendants across 
the nation must look to precedent for the respective charging jurisdiction, 
all can rely on the Court’s decisions and interpretations of the 
Constitution; tribal defendants are not afforded such predictability. It is 
unnecessarily burdensome and counter to the express intent of Congress 
in passing ICRA for defendants to determine the extent of rights and 
privileges after crossing each jurisdictional boundary.257 
                                                     
252. See supra note 86. 
253. Organization of Indian Tribes, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2012). 
254. Compare 1 N.N.C. §§ 1–9 (Navajo Nation Bill of Rights), with Tulalip Const. art. VII, 
https://www.codepublishing.com/WA/Tulalip/ [https://perma.cc/EA99-42H5] (Tulalip Bill of 
Rights). 
255. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197–98 (2004) (emphasis added). The U.S. Supreme 
Court initially held that tribal courts did not have jurisdiction over nonmembers in Duro v. Reina, 495 
U.S. 676 (1990). The Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4), legislatively remedied such lack 
of jurisdiction and was upheld as a proper relaxation by Congress of politically imposed restrictions 
upon the tribes. Lara, 541 U.S. at 196. 
256. Lara, 541 U.S. at 210. 
257. Take, for example, western Washington: there are twenty different recognized tribes within 
the Puget Sound watershed alone. Native American Tribes of the Puget Sound Watershed, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PUGET SOUND (2018), https://www.eopugetsound.org/terms/212 
[https://permacc/SP68-Q6B2]. An enrolled tribal member driving from Bellingham to Quinault 
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The passage of VAWA 2013 extended the jurisdiction of tribal courts 
to non-Indians who committed domestic violence on tribal reservations.258 
This was statutorily achieved by amending the language of ICRA.259 To 
exercise VAWA 2013 jurisdiction, tribes are required to extend all 
constitutional protections necessary for “Congress to recognize and affirm 
the inherent power of the participating tribe to exercise special domestic 
violence criminal jurisdiction over the defendant.”260 However, VAWA 
2013 speaks primarily to general due process requirements and not 
specifically to Fifth Amendment self-incrimination protections. The 
explicit recognition of the right to jury trials and the cross-reference to 
due process rights articulated under TLOA in the event of confinement 
supports this conclusion.261 Further, a non-Indian defendant over whom 
tribes exercise extended jurisdiction under VAWA 2013 is still subject to 
the concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal courts.262 Unlike tribal 
members in Indian country, to whom the Constitution does not apply,263 
non-Indian defendants subject to a tribal court’s jurisdiction due to 
charges of domestic violence are still entitled to Constitutional 
protections. Although unclear, the language of VAWA suggests that a 
tribal court must extend standard constitutional protections to a tribal 
defendant charged under VAWA statutes, meaning those rights and 
privileges enumerated in the Bill of Rights as interpreted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
If a tribal court were to extend a federal understanding of self-
incrimination protection to a non-Indian defendant, and yet hold ICRA to 
not be co-extensive, a tribal defendant charged with the same crime as a 
non-tribal defendant would be entitled to different protections. This dual-
                                                     
around the Olympic Peninsula could be subject to seventeen different tribal jurisdictions along the 
route, each one with an independently achieved interpretation of ICRA and unique self-incrimination 
protections. 
258. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, tit. IX, § 904, 127 
Stat. 54, 122 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (Supp. III 2015) (effective Jan. 3, 2016)); see 
also TRIBAL LAW AND POLICY INST., TRIBAL LEGAL CODE RESOURCE: TRIBAL LAWS 
IMPLEMENTING TLOA ENHANCED SENTENCING AND VAWA ENHANCED JURISDICTION 40 (Mar. 
2016) [hereineafter TRIBAL LEGAL CODE RESOURCE], http://www.tribal-
institute.org/download/codes/TLOA_VAWA_3-9-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LZQ-PD8N]. 
259. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304; Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 § 904. 
260. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(4). 
261. TRIBAL LEGAL CODE RESOURCE, supra note 258, at 17–18. For example, in the event of 
incarceration, tribal courts are required to ensure effective assistance of counsel, provide counsel for 
indigent defendants, and publish tribal laws, rules of evidence and rules of criminal procedure, among 
others. Id. 
262. 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (b)(2). 
263. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). 
18 - Kunze(2).docx (Do Not Delete) 1/6/2019 12:55 PM 
2018] REMAINING SILENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY 2169 
 
level of protection unnecessarily complicates proceedings for the courts, 
defendants, and attorneys; it is also blatantly contrary to the congressional 
intent underlying ICRA to extend the same rights to every tribal 
defendant. A tribe is also unlikely to make the policy decision to provide 
required protections to non-Indians yet deny them to tribal citizens 
charged with the same crime.264 
B. Tribal Court Precedent Strongly Suggests Adopting a Uniform 
Interpretation of ICRA’s Self-Incrimination Protections 
Various tribal jurisdictions have held ICRA’s protections against self-
incrimination to be coextensive with the Fifth Amendment.265 
Persuasively, the Northwest Intertribal Court System Court of Appeals, 
which covers fifteen independent tribes and court systems, and one of the 
only intertribal court systems in the United States,266 suggested that tribal 
statutes passed pursuant to ICRA and offering rights advisements are, 
without further legislative history, intended to abide by Miranda and the 
Fifth Amendment.267 Likewise, the Fort Peck Tribe Court of Appeals 
considered ICRA and the Fifth Amendment concurrently and equally in 
articulating the applicable rule of law, and held that neither dictated a 
rights advisement for voluntary incriminating statements.268 Most 
explicitly, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court held that ICRA’s protections 
against self-incrimination required Miranda-like rights advisements as 
required by the Fifth Amendment. 269 
The Supreme Court of Arizona also concluded, because of the identical 
language of the Fifth Amendment and ICRA, that a defendant in tribal 
court is entitled to invoke a privilege against self-incrimination 
coextensive with the Bill of Rights.270 Because Arizona is home to the 
majority of the Navajo reservation and its well-developed tribal court 
                                                     
264. See TRIBAL LEGAL CODE RESOURCE, supra note 258, at 40, 43–52 (offering various examples 
of tribal codes implementing the VAWA 2013 changes). 
265. Infra Part III. 
266. NORTHWEST INTERTRIBAL CT. SYS., https://www.nics.ws/about.html 
[https://perma.cc/6GYH-K9DP]. 
267. Southern Ute v. Henry, 15 NICS App. 35, 38 (Southern Ute Tribal Ct. App. 2017) (per 
curiam). 
268. Fort Peck Tribes v. Bighorn, No. 279, 1999 Mont. Fort Peck Tribe LEXIS 4, at *3 (Fort Peck 
Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1999). 
269. Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, No. SC-CR-03-04, 2004 Navajo Sup. LEXIS 13, at *12 (Navajo 
Nation Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 2004) (adopting “the minimum requirements from Miranda as consistent 
with [their] Navajo values”). 
270. Tracy v. Superior Court of Maricopa Cty., 810 P.2d 1030, 1047–48 (Ariz. 1991). 
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system, the decision is highly persuasive, even though not binding. 
Further, the Navajo tribal courts have also held that self-incrimination 
protections are “fundamental” and protected, including under the Navajo 
Bill of Rights.271 
Tribal courts, notably the NICS judicial consortium, have found it 
proper to impose a single interpretation of self-incrimination protections 
in accordance with the precedent set by the U.S. Supreme Court. The 
Eighth Circuit highlighted the difficulty defendants and tribal courts 
would otherwise encounter, bluntly stating that the powers of the federal 
judicial process “cannot be circumscribed by the speculative uses to which 
such testimony may subsequently be put by another sovereignty not 
subject to the commands of the Fifth Amendment.”272 
C. Decisions by Courts of Appeal Interpreting Analogous ICRA 
Protections Are Strongly Persuasive in the Event of Habeas Review 
and Should Be Adopted by District and Tribal Courts 
In consideration of tribal sovereignty, and a long history of interpreting 
statutes in favor of such sovereignty rather than federal precedent,273 
decisions by federal courts are not binding upon the tribal courts.274 
However, because tribal defendants may subsequently bring a writ of 
habeas corpus for violations of ICRA before a federal court,275 federal 
precedent becomes applicable in those cases. 
At least one Court of Appeals has implied, without deciding, that the 
protections afforded by ICRA are co-extensive with the Fifth Amendment 
and would prohibit compelled testimony.276 Likewise, the Ninth and 
Eighth Circuits both held that tribal searches and seizures are evaluated 
under a Fourth Amendment standard.277 Relying heavily on the identical 
language in both the Bill of Rights and ICRA, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that an analysis under the Fourth Amendment results in the 
same conclusion as an analysis under ICRA. Further, the court assumed 
                                                     
271. Navajo Nation v. MacDonald Jr., 19 Indian L. Rep. 6079, 6084 (Navajo Nation Sup. Ct. 1992). 
272. In re Long Visitor, 523 F.2d 443, 447 (8th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added). 
273. Tavares v. Whitehouse, 851 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2017). 
274. GARROW & DEER, supra note 152, at 248. 
275. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2012). 
276. In re Long Visitor, 523 F.2d at 447. 
277. United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lester, 
647 F.2d 869, 872 (8th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Clifford, 664 F.2d 1090, 1091 n.3 (8th 
Cir. 1981). 
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in Becerra-Garcia, as had others, that violations of ICRA would result in 
suppression of evidence during a federal proceeding.278 
Like the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment and 
ICRA, the language of the self-incrimination provisions is identical. 
Because of the “identical limitation”279 imposed on the federal and tribal 
governments by the respective language, courts are likely to apply Fifth 
Amendment analysis and precedent when hearing a motion to suppress in 
a federal proceeding or during a habeas hearing. It is counterproductive 
for tribal courts to apply an independent interpretation of the protections 
provided by ICRA, only to have a defendant released or a case remanded 
for rehearing by a federal court upon habeas review which applies Fifth 
Amendment standards. 
D. Tribal Prosecution Is a Sufficient Risk to Personal Liberty and 
Warrants Self-Incrimination Protections 
Unlike the truly foreign prosecutions addressed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Balsys,280 the semi-sovereign tribal nations within the United 
States pose a sufficient risk of prosecution for a defendant to invoke the 
right and privilege against self-incrimination. In the case of a tribal 
defendant, up to three separate jurisdictions may exercise their authority, 
with Double Jeopardy affecting none of the prosecutions. A tribal court 
could prosecute a hypothetical defendant and compel that defendant to 
testify under the tribal court’s standard. A state or federal court could then 
prosecute that same defendant using that compelled testimony as 
inculpatory evidence. Furthermore, a defendant may avoid a truly foreign 
threat of prosecution by avoiding the nation posing that threat (absent the 
risk of extradition). However, tribal defendants risk “foreign” prosecution 
every time they cross into a reservation—a reservation which may literally 
be across the street and be their childhood home. 
V. CONSTITUTIONALLY SUFFICIENT GRANTS OF 
IMMUNITY BY FEDERAL, STATE OR TRIBAL COURTS 
SHOULD BE MUTUALLY BINDING 
Legal precedent and ICRA’s congressional intent call for a Fifth 
Amendment analysis of ICRA violations. Additionally, courts should 
consider the possibility of prosecution in either a tribal, state, or federal 
court a sufficient threat for the defendant to invoke the privilege against 
                                                     
278. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d at 1171. 
279. Id. 
280. See supra text accompanying notes 59–63. 
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self-incrimination. Having adopted a singular self-incrimination analysis, 
grants of immunity satisfying the Kastigar standards warrant a mutually 
binding effect across tribal, state, and federal court. 
A. The Policy and Constitutional Reasoning Making Federal and 
State Grants of Immunity Binding Applies Equally to Tribal Courts 
Various theories underlie mutually binding grants of immunity and are 
directly applicable to tribal defendants. In Murphy, the Court held that 
mutually binding grants of immunity are permissible, as the other 
jurisdiction is left in the same situation as if the defendant invoked the 
privilege against self-incrimination.281 This is especially relevant if a 
defendant subject to concurrent jurisdiction is entitled to invoke self-
incrimination protections in federal or state court due to the possibility of 
prosecution in tribal court, or vice versa. However, the adoption of a 
singular Fifth Amendment standard is a prerequisite for mutually binding 
grants of immunity to ensure that all jurisdictions are operating under the 
same circumstance; otherwise, Murphy would ring hollow. 
Even if a court found that prosecution in a tribal court is insufficient to 
invoke self-incrimination privileges elsewhere, the application of a Fifth 
Amendment standard would preclude the use of testimony in a tribal court 
compelled by another jurisdiction. As the Court held in United States v. 
Allen,282 the use of compelled testimony is precluded, even if generated 
by a foreign jurisdiction, when the protections provided are 
constitutionally insufficient.283 Therefore, mutually binding grants of 
immunity would result in an outcome similar to one in which a defendant 
exercises the full panoply of privileges and protections offered by ICRA 
and the Fifth Amendment. 
Additionally, as the Supreme Court of Arizona identified in Tracy, the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s language in Murphy pointed to a broader 
applicability than merely a state/federal relationship.284 Murphy permits 
the use of compelled, immunized testimony in “one jurisdiction within 
our federal structure” even if such evidence would support a conviction 
in “another such jurisdiction.”285 Although tribal jurisdictions are quasi-
sovereign entities, they remain within the “federal structure” of the United 
States, subject to the plenary powers of Congress; this unique relationship 
                                                     
281. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964). 
282. 864 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2017). 
283. Id. at 82. 
284. Tracy v. Superior Court of Maricopa Cty., 810 P.2d 1030, 1049 (Ariz. 1991). 
285. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 53 (emphasis added). 
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gives rise to “a distinct likelihood of dual prosecution by tribal and federal 
courts.”286 As such, Murphy could and should be extended to include tribal 
courts. 
Arguably, both tribal and federal precedent have already established a 
legal construct in which prosecutors cannot use immunized and compelled 
testimony directly or as a derivative, and mutually binding grants of 
immunity are a mere formality. However, formal recognition of the 
mutually binding effects would simplify and streamline criminal 
prosecutions, as well as avoid the need to litigate the issue every time 
grants of immunity are present. 
B. Grants of Immunity Empower Tribal Nations, Validate Tribal 
Justice System Procedures, and Facilitate Alternative Resolutions 
In addition to serving as a formal recognition of grants of immunity, 
especially by tribal courts, mutually binding effects would have second 
level benefits as well. Extending recognition of tribal grants of immunity 
would place tribal courts on equal footing with federal and state 
counterparts. Granting immunity is almost exclusively a reflection of 
prosecutorial priorities and policies that, to date, have not included the 
priorities of tribal prosecutions.287 By imposing Kastigar limitations on 
subsequent prosecutions following tribal grants of immunity, tribal courts 
(and, tangentially, tribal leadership) may give true effect to tribal priorities 
on courts with concurrent jurisdiction. 
Further, recognition would likely impose a duty, especially on federal 
prosecutors, to include tribes with concurrent jurisdiction in discussions 
prior to pursuing consecutive prosecutions or offering grants of immunity. 
Because current policy requires cooperative efforts only between federal 
and state prosecutors,288 the decision-making process fails to definitively 
include tribal prosecutors beyond professional courtesy. However, by 
making grants of immunity mutually binding across all three types of 
jurisdiction, all are impacted by the decision of one and will require the 
input of all jurisdictions involved. 
Tribes will also be able to make decisions as to what they consider the 
proper course of action, without the fear of future state or federal 
prosecution utilizing tribally immunized testimony and undermining the 
tribal decision. This will also enhance the tribe’s abilities to pursue more 
traditional remedies, such as Elder Panels, which focus heavily on 
                                                     
286. Tracy, 810 P.2d at 1049. 
287. CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 85, § 720. 
288. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 141, § 9-2.031. 
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truthfulness and reconciliation, by offering a defendant the proper level of 
immunity in exchange for full participation in such a remedy. 
CONCLUSION 
Tribal, state, and federal cases demonstrate a continuing reluctance to 
impose a constitutional gloss on the self-incrimination protections 
mandated by the Indian Civil Rights Act. Instead, courts interpret statutes 
in favor of tribal independence and sovereignty rather than constitutional 
compliance. In the absence of a repeal of ICRA, this Comment argues for 
the evaluation of ICRA’s privilege against self-incrimination under a Fifth 
Amendment standard along with associated federal precedent. Some 
courts, including federal, state, and tribal courts, have reached a similar 
conclusion. Meanwhile, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits of Appeal have set 
an analogous and persuasive precedent, imposing a federal standard and 
analysis of tribal searches and seizures due to the almost identical 
language of the Bill of Rights and ICRA. This Comment also suggests 
that grants of immunity to compel testimony by a tribal, state, or federal 
court should be mutually binding and evaluated under the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Kastigar v. United States. Such mutual effect furthers 
the gravitas and authority of tribal decisions, provides clarity and 
consistent protections for a defendant, and empowers tribes to pursue 
appropriate sanctions, remedies, and reconciliation. 
 
